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ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT: THE CORNERSTONE
OF PUBLIC TRUST
ARCHIBALD Cox*
I. INTRODUCTION
For twenty years or more, extraordinary public attention has
been focused upon the ethics of government officials. On the one
hand, the years are marked by the promulgation of new and tight-
ened codes often accompanied by new machinery for administration
and enforcement. The West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act en-
acted under the leadership of Governor Caperton and Speaker
Chambers is an example.' The Code of Ethics for Government Serv-
ice promulgated by Joint Resolution of the Congress in 1958,2 the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 3 and a new law enacted in 19894
illustrate the federal measures.
At the same time, the record of abuses grows. About three years
ago, the New York Times characterized the shameful record of of-
ficials in the Nation's Capitol: "Whether measured by the rank or
the sheer numbers of officials who have come under ethical suspicion
* Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University and Visiting Professor of
Law at Boston University. The following article was presented as the Charles L. Ihlenfeld Lecture
at the West Virginia University College of Law in March 1991.
1. For the text and an important commentary upon the law, see ROBERT T. HAL, Tan WEsT
VmGImN GovmwtnrmN. Ermcs AcT (1989).
2. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (enacted) [hereinafter H.R. Con. Res.
175].
3. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
4. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-94, 103 Stat. 1716.
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and criminal investigation the amount of sleaze is awesome." 5
The editor was thinking of the Under-Secretary of Commerce
who negotiated for a highly paid executive office in the corporation
with which he was simultaneously negotiating the price at which he
would sell government satellites; of the Counselor to the President
who pressed for high-level government office the names of men who
had won his favor by bailing him out of personal financial difficulty;
of the White House officials as well as former members of Congress
who, upon leaving government service, rushed to trade their con-
nections and influence for spectacular fees; and of the billions of
dollars in defense contracts'revealed to be tainted by corruption.
The sad revelations continued. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives was forced by proof of his unethical practices to
resign his seat. So was the majority whip. A Senator from Minnesota
was admonished by the Senate for larding his expense account. The
much publicized "Keating Five" Senators accepted financial favors
totaling almost $1,800,000 for their election campaigns from Charles
Keating, the political and financial promoter, and brought their
combined power and prestige to bear upon federal regulatory of-
ficials on his behalf. Here in West Virginia, the former Governor
and five prominent members of the Legislature have been convicted
of financial crimes. In Arizona, the public is watching videotapes
of seven prominent members of the state legislature apparently ac-
cepting bribes.
The result is cynicism and indifference. Seventy-three percent of
the public believes-that the government is concerned only with the
welfare of special interests - not the common good. More than
half the people polled say that all Senators and Representatives are
corrupt.
Representative government of, by, and for the people cannot
survive such a loss of public trust. We are not powerless as citizens,
but we do need to ask and work out answers to some hard questions:
(1) Why have the ethical standards actually practiced in Wash-
ington and in many state capitals so sharply declined?
5. A Year of Shame, N.Y Tnms, Jan. 3, 1988, § 4, at 14.
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(2) What standards should we expect of our executive officials,
Senators, and Representatives? Why?
(3) What contributions can laws and codes make, and what are
their limits?
Being a law professor from the age in which we persistently pur-
sued the case method, I propose to focus tonight on the specific
case of the Keating Five in an effort to draw broader principles out
of that case and its variants. I shall try to present the case fairly;
but perhaps I should tell you at the outset that I regard the failure
of the Senate Ethics Committee to discipline all the Keating Five as
a spineless evasion in the face of an urgent need for moral lead-
ership.
II.
Let me first recall the facts. 6 Charles H. Keating, the dominant
figure in Lincoln Federal Savings and Loan, was a high-flying pro-
moter operating in both political and financial worlds. In 1980, for
example, he was briefly the head of John B. Connally's unsuccessful
Presidential campaign - the year before he was charged by the
Securities and Exchange Commission with fraud in deals involving
Ohio banks. In Ohio, he became the close friend of Senator John
Glenn. When he went to Arizona, he took with him as his lobbyist
Jim Grogan from Senator Glenn's staff. Keating and Senator Glenn
kept up their friendship. Keating raised campaign contributions to-
taling $34,000 for Senator Glenn's 1984 and 1988 political cam-
paigns. In 1985 and 1986, he arranged two $100,000 corporate
contributions to one of Senator Glenn's political action committees.
In Arizona, Keating became a friend of Senator John McCain
- enough so that the McCains would travel to the Bahama Islands
in the airplanes of a Keating corporation and enjoy expense-free
vacations at Keating's home. They were natural political allies: both
vehemently conservative on both regulatory and social issues. Lin-
6. The factual material and quotations in this lecture concerning the so-called "Keating Five"
were taken from press releases and press reports upon the proceedings before the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Ethics.
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coln Federal was promoting a boom in Arizona real estate, in which
the Senator's wife and father-in-law had large investments. In the
mid-1980s, Keating, his family, and his business associates contrib-
uted about $112,000 to Senator McCain's political campaigns.
The links between Keating and Arizona's other Senator, Dennis
DeConcini, go back to 1981 when Senator DeConcini sought Keat-
ing's help in winning reelection. Keating joined Senator DeConcini's
finance committee; he also put together $33,000 for the Senator from
family and business associates. In the mid-1980s, Keating arranged
further campaign contributions totaling another $48,100. He and
Senator DeConcini kept in close touch about the Savings and Loan
(hereinafter S & L) business. The Senator pressed hard on President
Reagan to appoint to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board a Keating
ally who had received millions of dollars in loans from Lincoln
Federal. Earlier, in 1981, he had sought to have Keating named
Ambassador to the Bahama Islands.
Senator Cranston received the benefit of the largest sums from
Keating's fund-raising. Speculative savings and loan associations were
highly active in California. Lincoln Federal did business there. When
Keating's chief lobbyist met Senator Cranston at a Democratic Party
affair in 1984, the Senator said, "I've worked hard for California
savings and loans. You all should really support me." Keating did.
He produced $10,000 for Senator Cranston's 1984 Presidential bid,
$39,000 for his 1986 reelection campaign, and $850,000 for a "get
out the vote" drive aimed at voters who would support Senator
Cranston and other Democratic candidates. Later Senator Cranston
requested, and Keating procured, a further $850,000 in corporate
support for voter education projects sponsored by the Senator.
By January 1987, Lincoln Federal was in serious trouble. Its
solvency was uncertain, and the honesty and legality of some of its
practices were in question. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
was pressing an investigation into Lincoln Federal that might well
lead to the government's taking over control of it. So Keating set
out to cultivate Senator Riegel, who was then due to become Chair-
man of the Senate Banking Committee. At a meeting with Senator
Riegel and the Senator's top political operative, Keating offered to
host a fund-raiser yielding $125,000. (In fact, the affair raised
[Vol. 94
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$78,250.) Keating also arranged to have a managing partner in the
large and highly regarded accounting firm, Arthur Young & Com-
pany, prepare a statement designed to persuade Senator Riegel and
later Senators Glenn, McCain, and DeConcini that Lincoln Federal
was strong, profitable, and the victim of unfair treatment by the
regulatory officials. Perhaps it is not surprising that the Senators
gave weight to the presentation. Accounting firms purport to take
an independent hard-nosed look. But in this case, the supposedly
independent auditor would shortly go to work for Lincoln Federal
at an annual salary of about $900,000, and it would become plain
that the regulators were right. Lincoln Federal's insolvency would
cost taxpayers $10,000,000,000.
A few days later Senators Riegel and Keating were together in
Phoenix on another fund-raising trip of Senator Riegel's. They dis-
cussed Lincoln Federal's problem with the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB). Either then or shortly later the notion emerged
that all five Senators should meet with Edwin J. Gray, the Board's
Chairman, to see if they could not solve Keating's problem.
Senator DeConcini arranged a meeting on April 2, 1987. Senator
Riegel was not present. Chairman Gray was told that he must come
alone. Staff aides from the Senators' offices were excluded. The
accounts of the meeting are contradictory, but the conclusion is
inescapable that the meeting was designed to impress and did impress
Chairman Gray with the amount of Senatorial power and prestige
concerned with Keating's interests.
Two topics were discussed. One was the need for relaxation or
nonenforcement of the FHLBB "direct investment" rule designed
to limit certain highly speculative S & L practices. Lincoln Federal's
plight was due to excessive speculation and further speculation barred
by the rule offered the only hope of financial salvation. The second
topic was the FHLBB investigation of Lincoln Federal's activities
being conducted in San Francisco. When Gray proved ignorant of
the details, plans were made to have the San Francisco examiners
brought to Washington to face the five Senators.
At that meeting a week later, all five Senators were present.
Senator DeConcini explained to the examiners, "We wanted to meet
1991-92]
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with you because we have determined that potential actions of yours
could injure a constituent." Five Senators with all their power and
prestige were facing administrative staff. The Senators also specif-
ically proposed that a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of some of
Lincoln Federal's investments be expedited, but that meanwhile "you
grant them forbearance." The message is clear enough to anyone
who knows Washington.
The Senators backed off a little when the examiners explained
that they were considering referring the case to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution. Senators McCain and Glenn did
nothing more for Keating, but Senators DeConcini and Cranston
kept on trying to help. The San Francisco examiners soon recom-
mended that FHLBB take over Lincoln Federal, but almost two
more years passed before the agency heads in Washington took ac-
tion. That delay alone is estimated to have cost taxpayers $1.3 bil-
lion.
So much for the facts. The Senate Ethics Committee found that
only Senator Cranston might have violated the Senate's ethical stan-
dards, but we should think the case through for ourselves with both
the particular instance and the more general questions in mind.
III.
Let us start with an easy case, even though it is a little way
apart. We all agree that it is corrupt for a public official, a judge,
the head of a government agency, or a member of a local board
of zoning appeals to accept money or other favors in return for a
favorable decision. But why?
The reason, of course, is that the decision would then be influ-
enced by a factor other than concern for the public good. In the
Federalist Papers, James Madison stated the fundamental principle
that should guide all our thinking about ethics in government: "The
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and the most
virtue to pursue the common good of society; and in the next place,
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous
whilst they continue to hold the public trust."' 7
7. THE FEDERALiST No. 57, at 383 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
[Vol. 94
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We speak of public office as a "public trust" because the same
principle lies behind the fiduciary obligations of all private trustees.
The trustee has undertaken to act for the benefit of others; therefore,
he must avoid any situation that would or might cause trust decisions
to be influenced by anything other than the welfare of the bene-
ficiaries. Because public officials have undertaken to act for the
common good, they too must exclude conflicting concerns. The prin-
ciple lies behind, and should govern the interpretation of, the key
section of the recent West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act: "A
public official or public employee may not intentionally use his or
her office.., for his or her own private gain or that of any other
person . .. .,,
I fear that one explanation of the spread of unethical practices
is the fading of belief, first, in what Madison called the "common
good of society" and, second, in the quality that the Framers called
"virtue" - the performance of the opportunity and duty of every
citizen to pursue the common good. For much of our history, we
Americans had a deep sense that we were engaged in a unique,
common adventure binding us all together - binding each gener-
ation not only to its parents and grandparents from whom the ad-
venture was inherited but also to its children and to their children
to whom the torch would pass. Now, however, the idea of a common
good and the citizen's duty to pursue it grows weak.
To identify all the reasons would take a wiser man than I and
more time than we have. One explanation may lie deep in the prag-
matism, skepticism, and cynicism that make ours an age of disbelief,
with little faith in ideas and ideals and lacking heroes because our
gaze is riveted on human flaws. Our very numbers and the size,
diversity, and complexity of modem society play a part. Further-
more, political scientists tell us that the public interest is no more
than an aggregation of special interests - an analysis that makes
it all too easy to serve one or another special interest including
oneself. A third explanation may be the contemporary weakening
and break-up of those personal bonds that once taught how much
we depend upon others and how much they depend upon us: for
8. W. VA. CODE § 6B-2-5 (1990); HA, supra note 1, at 61.
1991-92]
7
Cox: Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
example, the bonds of marriage, family, neighborhood, and church.
But even as we note such forces, surely we must hold to the
sense of community and require our public officials to base their
conduct and decisions exclusively upon an appraisal of the common
good. Both a free society and a democratic government require a
high degree of public confidence in the integrity of those chosen to
govern. You cannot have freedom if there must be a policeman for
every citizen to force his payment of taxes and compliance with the
law. The public will not give the necessary trust to those who present
government as the place where one feathers his own nest, exchanges
favors with friends and former associates, and takes good care of
those who will reward them.
We see the consequence of diminishing public confidence already
in the polls I cited earlier, in the fierce opposition to increasing the
compensation of public officials, in the declining interest in running
for local office, and in participating/voting in elections.
IV.
Some of you may be thinking that what I have been saying is
true enough for judges and possibly for all executive branch offi-
cials, but that it will not do for Senators, Representatives in Con-
gress, and other legislators who must stand for election. It may be
admirable, you might say, for a legislator to put principle ahead of
votes in the next election as he performs his role, but we all know
that many legislators make the speeches, render constituent services,
and cast the votes that will win them support at the polls on election
day, yet we do not tax them with ethical violations. What is the
difference, you may ask, between those practices and frankly ex-
changing constituent services - the use of Senatorial prestige and
power - for the money with which to win reelection, provided that
the Senator does not line his own pocket?
In my opinion, failure to mark and enforce the difference is the
second important source of public sleaziness and corruption. And
this source is controllable. The difference has two parts. First, we
cannot, and those charged with enforcing ethical standards should
not, attempt to psychoanalyze our legislators sufficiently accurately
[Vol. 94
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to separate (1) votes cast solely upon personal consideration of the
common good, from (2) votes cast as a delegate to express the whole
constituency's wishes, from (3) votes cast to win electoral support
from a particular group. But as soon as money with which to pursue
the legislator's personal self-interest is proven to be a factor, the
lack of exclusive attention to the public interest becomes clear.
Second, and more important, exchanging a Senator's or any other
elected representative's vote or the use 6f his power or prestige for
the money with which to win reelection violates the basic democratic
principle - we are to be equal before government as individuals,
not favored according to the depth of one's purse. When govern-
mental decisions come to be made and administered to meet the
needs of the financially powerful, not according to judgments of
the common good, loss of public confidence in government will
inevitably follow and the society will decline.
V.
We can now come closer to the actual case of the Keating Five.
There was no direct evidence that any of the five consciously ex-
changed intervention in the FHLBB proceeding for Keating's fi-
nancial aid. The five denied the link. The Senate Ethics Committee
believed at least four of them, but was sharply critical of Senator
Cranston. In dealing with Senators DeConcini, Riegel, McCain, and
Glenn, the Committee stressed three points:
(1) They "violated no law of the United States or specific rule
of the United States Senate."
(2) The campaign contributions they received were all made, re-
ceived, and reported in accordance with the laws regulating cam-
paign finance.
(3) "It is a necessary function of a Senator's office," the Com-
mittee said, "to intervene with officials of the executive branch and
independent agencies on behalf of individuals when the facts war-
rant, and it is a Senator's duty to make decisions on whether to
intervene without regard to whether they have contributed to the
Senator's campaigns or causes."
1991-92]
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The Committee noted that the conjunction of intervention and
receipt of campaign funds might raise an appearance of impropriety,
and went on to observe that Senators DeConcini and Riegel used
"poor judgment" in giving the appearance of acting improperly.
Nevertheless, the Committee said that no further action by it or the
full Senate was warranted, and it could not bring itself to use any
harsher words than "do not condone," apparently because the Sen-
ators had violated no law of the United States or specific Senate
rule.
In reflecting on this decision, and more importantly on the ethical
standards we should apply to our Senators and the Senate to its
members, it is worth noting that the Ethics Committee rejected the
appearance standard pressed upon it by its own Independent Counsel
Robert S. Bennett and embodied in the codes of conduct of every
branch of government except - we are now told - the United States
Senate. The Code of Ethics for Government Service adopted by
concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress provides a good
example: "Any person in government service should: 5. Never...
accept, for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circum-
stances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influ-
encing the performance of his governmental duties." 9
The Report of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service recommending the Code clearly states: "The committee un-
derstands and intends that this resolution apply to every servant of
the public whether he be the President, a Member of Congress, a
lifelong career employee .... ."0 The principle applies throughout
the Executive Branch. The latest formulation states:
(g) Employees shall not use public office for private gain;
(h) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any
private organization or individual;
(n) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that
they are violating the law or the ethical standards promulgated pursuant to this
order."
9. H.R. Con. Res. 175, supra note 2.
10. S. REP. No. 1812, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
11. Executive Order No. 12,674, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,159 (1989).
[Vol. 94
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Essentially the same rule is stated in every code of judicial con-
duct. The Ethics Manual of the House of Representatives states the
principle: A general ethical standard recognized by the House notes
that Members and employees should not accept favors or benefits
for themselves or their families "under circumstances which might
be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance
of [their] governmental duties."2
When the Statement of the Senate Ethics Committee is read in
the context of the otherwise uniform rule, it can only mean "we
will not reprimand or ask the Senate to reprimand a Senator for
violating a principle applicable in both public and private life to
everyone who is not a Senator."
Unless used with care, the term "appearance standard" is mis-
leading. In part, the term is a euphemism sparing those who violate
the principle the full opprobrium heaped upon one who consciously
takes a bribe. But the case is not simply one of deceptive appearances
condemning one who appears to do wrong when in fact he is in-
nocent. The judge or trustee who acts in a situation in which the
decision may affect personal interests does wrong no matter how
conscientiously he seeks rigidly to shut the self-interest out of his
mind. He does wrong because he cannot be sure that the personal
interest did not affect his judgment.
The case is the same with the public officials, including Senators
and Representatives. If a Senator votes or performs what is called
"constituent service" in a way that serves the interests of those who
have conferred or will confer benefits upon him, neither he nor
anyone else can know whether gratitude for the past, or hope of
the future, benefit diverted him from the public duty of considering
only the public good. Paul Douglas, one of the truly great Senators
of the 1940s and 1950s, put the point so much better than I can
that I ask your indulgence to read a passage:
What happens is a gradual shifting of a man's loyalties from the community to
those who have been doing him favors. His final decisions are, therefore, made
in response to his private friendships and loyalties rather than to the public good.
12. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS.
AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 23 (1987).
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Throughout this whole process the official will claim - and may indeed believe
- that there is no causal connection between the favors he has received and the
decisions which he makes. He will assert that the favors were given and received
on the basis of pure friendship unsullied by worldly considerations. He will claim
that the decisions, on the other hand, will have been made on the basis of the
justice and equity of the particular case. The two series of acts will be alleged
to be as separate as the east is from the west. Moreover, the whole process may
be so subtle as not to be detected by the official himself. 1
Senator Douglas was speaking of entertainment, gifts, and other
much smaller favors than those that have become common in the
1980s, but the point is the same.
Such conduct is wrong for another reason. Regardless of the
official's state of mind, it undermines public confidence in govern-
ment scarcely less than officials who are consciously corrupt. The
public will not give the necessary trust to those who present gov-
ernment as the place where one feathers his own nest, exchanges
favors with friends and former associates, and takes good care of
those who provide money for the next election.
In thinking about the ethical standards to which we should expect
all those in government to conform, it is important to digress for
a moment from the case of the Keating Five in order to note that
Senator Douglas's reasoning would condemn a number of other
shabby practices that burgeoned in Washington in the 1980s and
dulled the moral sensitivity of public officials.
The receipt of honoraria is one such practice. Former Repre-
sentative Preyer has testified that in writing the House of Repre-
sentatives Code of Conduct, "[w]e were naive and never envisioned
[honoraria] as a supplement to income of congressmen with money
from special interests with legislation before Congress, often for
brief and not very substantive talks or appearances."'' 4 But the wide-
spread belief that special interests with money for Congressmen could
command special favors soon destroyed the illusion. In 1987 Mem-
bers of Congress received a record-shattering $9.8 million in hon-
13. PAUL H. DouGLAs, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 44 (1952).
14. R. Preyer, Statement to House Bi-Partisan Commission on Ethics (May 24, 1989) (Transcript
on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
[Vol. 94
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oraria, of which they pocketed $7.5 million and gave the rest to
charity. "It's the wave of the future," predicted an official of the
American Trucking Associations, which alone distributed $117,500.
Paying honoraria is "sort of the way business is done," explained
a defense contractor: "We're living at the government trough, so
to speak, and we feel we've got to contribute back to it." Consider
one specific example. On April 1, 1987, Oshkosh Truck Corpora-
tion, a maker of ten-ton trucks, paid $2,000 to each of seven Rep-
resentatives who were members of the House Armed Services
Committee for attending a breakfast. Six of the seven were members
of the Procurement Subcommittee. Within hours the six had voted
to amend pending legislation to require the Army to purchase 500
more Oshkosh trucks than the Defense Department wanted. The
price for the additional trucks was $65 million. 15
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 abolished the honoraria system
for members of the House of Representatives, their staff employees,
and employees of the House. The Act also bars any official or em-
ployee of the Executive Branch from receiving any honorarium, any
payment for a speech, book, magazine .article, or like undertaking.
The Senators clung to their honoraria, unwilling to give up so wel-
come a source of personal income even though they barred it to
executive officials and saw the House Members surrender it. The
1989 Act does limit individual Senators to $26,500 in honoraria kept
for personal use and promises further reduction sometime in the
future if and when their salaries are further increased.
The recent action of the Senate Ethics Committee declining either
to judge or to ask the full Senate to judge fellow Senators by the
appearance standard recommended by its Counsel seems to reflect
a similar unwillingness of Senators to be guided by the standards
applicable to private trustees and everyone else in government. The
absence of a specific Senate Rule is not an adequate justification.
The Ethics Committee's responsibility as stated in the Senate Rules
is to "receive complaints and investigate allegations of: improper
15. See Jim Carlton, $2,000 to Each From Supplier; Badham, 5 Colleagues Took Money Before
Vote, L.A. TiwsS, June 11, 1988, at 201; Cash Gifts Coincided With Vote, Cm. Tius., June 11,
1988, at C-3.
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conduct which may reflect upon the Senate .... ,,16 That respon-
sibility was vested in the Senate with the explanation that the Ethics
Committee "would not be limited to alleged violations of Senate
rules, but it would take into account all improper conduct of any
kind whatsoever." 17
Two groups of questions remain, both suggested by Senator In-
ouye's defense of the Keating Five in which he argued, "If they are
guilty, we all are." One group goes to the particular case. Was the
five Senators' acceptance of huge sums of lawful campaign money
from Keating with one hand and intervention into the FHLBB pro-
ceeding in his behalf with the other hand so typical of the behavior
of Senators that it could not be fairly censured as "improper conduct
reflecting upon the Senate?" The second, larger group of questions
are those which we face as citizens: Should we say to Senator Inouye,
"You all are guilty?" Is the raising of huge sums of campaign money
with one hand while performing for the contributors what is eu-
phemistically called "constituent service" with the other hand an
acceptable practice for our elected representatives? Or is it a prime
cause of the degradation of ethical standards in government?
VI.
In my opinion, Mr. Bennett, the Ethics Committee's Counsel,
had compelling reasons for concluding that there were critical dif-
ferences between the conduct of the Keating Five and the usual mine
run of "constituent services" extended to campaign contributors.
First, the financial benefits provided by Keating from family, friends,
and business associates were extraordinarily large, and it was obvious
that he was seeking to buy influence, as he himself has said. Second,
the Senators were intervening into a specific regulatory investigation
of the affairs of a particular savings and loan widely known for
speculation and, at best, in shaky financial condition. Such contacts
are unusual and, when made, are usually handled with caution.
Third, the Senators' use of their prestige and power was ex-
traordinarily heavy-handed. Bringing the FHLBB Chairman alone
16. S. Res. 338, as amended by S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
17. 110 CONG. REc. 16933 (1964).
[Vol. 94
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to face four Senators and the San Francisco examiners to face five
Senators were extraordinary steps, calculated, regardless of what was
said, to impress the Chairman and examiners with the amount of
senatorial power and prestige friendly to Keating. No executive branch
official or employee could fail to be aware that the favor or disfavor
of any one of the five Senators could greatly affect the work of his
agency and his own future in government.
The three differences called for sharp condemnation of all five
Senators' conduct even though the present laws and the ethical norms
actually practiced by many Senators and Representatives leave wide
room to render what are called "constituent services" and otherwise
to act and vote in the interest of those who make and gather cam-
paign contributions.
VII.
The differences look less important when we turn to such ques-
tions as: (1) Why have ethical norms in Washington so shockingly
declined?; and (2) To what ethical standard should we hold our
public officials, including elected legislators?
Senator Inouye's testimony points to the danger. Mr. Bennett,
Counsel to the Ethics Committee, stated it explicitly:
More and more constituents are requesting the assistance of the Congressmen at
the same time that those Congressmen must ask more and more of the same
constituents for campaign contributions. I ask you this: how can our system of
government maintain the appearance and the reality of integrity as these trends
continue? Now none of this is an excuse for wrongdoing, if wrongdoing occurred.
It is, however, I respectfully submit to you, a booming warning that unless these
trends are recognized and dealt with, we will have more cases like this and the
reputation of this body and its members will be in utter ruin.
A few facts and figures fill out Mr. Bennett's warning. For half
a century, the role of government as tax-gatherer, as purchaser, as
regulator, and as subsidizer has been expanding. Nearly all busi-
nesses are interested in some legislative measure of one sort or an-
other. Nearly all are affected by procurement policies, or other
executive and administrative rulings. An ever-increasing number are
directly involved in proceedings before executive and administrative
agencies. At the same time, the money cost of congressional election
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campaigns has skyrocketed and continues to rise. The winners of
House seats in 1988 spent an average of $300,000 - more than
double the expenditure ten years before. Senate winners spent an
average of $3 million in 1988 and about the same figure in 1990,
even though there were no 1990 Senatorial elections in large states
like New York and California. That means that the average Senator
must raise $10,000 each and every week of his entire six-year term
unless he expects to retire.
What better way, then, for one of the ever-increasing number
of special business interests affected by government to influence gov-
ernmental decisions affecting them than to provide the $10,000 in
campaign money needed to a United States Senator for each and
every week of his six-year term. True, the statutes limit individual
contributions to $1,000. But there is nothing to prevent, and eve-
rything to encourage, an individual to gather tens of thousands of
dollars in individual contributions as Keating did, and there are also
hosts of Political Action Committees. Rendering unlimited financial
help that is technically outside the ceilings has also become easy.
Witness the $200,000 in Keating's corporate contributions to Senator
Glenn's National Council on Public Policy and his two $850,000
gifts to political groups controlled by Senator Cranston.
The method by which we finance political campaign is surely the
most insidious of the influences generating the decline of ethical
standards in Washington. Having accepted and watched one's col-
leagues intervene with executive agencies and vote in committee and
on the floor in a way that advances the interests of those who have
provided large sums in lawful campaign contributions, it is all too
easy to slide over the line and accept other corrupt financial aid.
Those with money become "actors," "players," political associates,
and friends. At best, the Congressman fools himself because the
psychological forces described by Senator Paul Douglas come into
play - there is the subtle "shifting of loyalties from the community
to those who have been doing the legislator favors" of which the
legislator may not even be aware. Too often the shift will be ac-
companied by a conscious fear of losing the sinews of an expensive
reelection campaign. At worst the money is consciously allowed to
buy "constituent service" and even votes.
[Vol. 94
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Even the defenders of the present system acknowledge that cam-
paign money buys access to the recipient not available to other cit-
izens. Buying access buys influence upon the use of a Senator's or
Representative's prestige and power, and even his vote, not only for
the reasons explained by Senator Douglas but also for another rea-
son. No lawyer or litigant would believe that they had received jus-
tice if only the opposing party were allowed to present evidence and
argument and only the lawyer for the opposing party were allowed
to confer with the judge in chambers, even though no money passed.
No one, party or bystander, would believe that hearing only one
side and hearing that side in private would not shape the outcome
in a large proportion of the cases. Yet this is the effect of our present
Congressional practices. There are doctors' PACs, but no patients'
PACs; used car dealers' PACs, but no car buyers' PACs; real estate
dealers,' builders,' and bankers' PACs, but no PACs representing
young families looking for affordable homes.
The huge sums of money involved and the dominant influence
of Senators and Congressmen within the Capitol City affect the
entire moral tone. If scores of Senators and Representatives are seen
to be advancing their selfish political interests by seeking money
from lobbyists willing to exchange money for influence upon their
votes, why should a bureau chief or an Assistant Secretary refuse
financial favor from the officer of a firm seeking government con-
tracts or exemption from regulation or from an individual seeking
an appointment which the official may influence or award? The
morale of thousands of faithful government officials who would
otherwise honor the public's trust is eroded. Bad, even dangerous
as these consequences and the waste, shoddy performance, and fa-
voritism may be, the greatest costs of both the sleaziness and the
present method of financing political campaigns are the erosion of
our sense of community purpose and the loss of public trust.
Conversely, the most effective step we as citizens can take to
improve ethical standards and rebuild public confidence in govern-
ment is to insist upon the enactment of strong campaign finance
reforms at the present Congress. Effective legislation must comprise
five elements:
First, the law must set voluntary ceilings on the total expenditures
by a candidate for the Senate or House of Representatives. The race
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to outspend opponents drives the race to get money. A reasonable
Senate ceiling should be fixed for each state; perhaps $950,000 for
small states and several million for large states like California and
New York.
Second, candidates who accept the voluntary ceilings should be
eligible for federal assistance: either public financing or vouchers
for television and radio broadcast time up to half the overall ceiling.
This element is necessary for two reasons. First, because the Supreme
Court has held that mandatory ceilings violate the First Amend-
ment,18 there is need for an incentive to induce candidates to agree
to limit their spending. 19 Second, private campaign money flows so
preponderantly to incumbents that incumbents were reelected to
ninety-eight percent of the House seats in 1988 and 1990. Public
financial assistance or TV vouchers would help restore meaningful
elections. And the money spent is spent to ensure the integrity of
government no less than that spent for police and watchers at the
polls.
Third, PAC contributions must be either abolished or subjected
to an overall ceiling on the total amount of PAC money a candidate
can accept. The sum of $100,000 for a House candidate seems a
reasonable figure, if the legislation takes the second course.
Fourth, so-called "independent expenditures" in support of, or
opposition to, a designated candidate must be restricted, and/or
discouraged or both. In Presidential elections, the ban on spending
in excess of the public funding has been circumvented since 1980
by setting up purportedly independent committees to raise and spend
additional funds in ways which are by any common sense definition
"coordinated" with the candidate's campaign.
Fifth, so-called "soft money" must be eliminated from the pub-
licly funded Presidential elections and kept out of Senate and House
races. In 1988, both the Bush and Dukakis campaigns egregiously
18. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
19. The constitutionality of such induced limitations, as applied to Presidential election cam-
paigns, was upheld in Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd,
445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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violated or circumvented the statutory plan for exclusive public fi-
nancing in Presidential general elections by raising and having spent
through the state parties tens of millions of dollars claimed to be
exempt from federal law because the money went to "party build-
ing" or "the straight party ticket." Some individual and corporate
contributions were reminiscent of Watergate; for example, the six
$100,000 contributions to President Bush from S & L executives,
including Charles Keating.
The Senate passed such a bill last year. The House passed only
an empty pretense. This year a strong bill will shortly come up for
action in the Senate, and there is solid support for reform in the
House. If the public raises its voice, true reform legislation will be
on the President's desk by fall.
VIII.
May I add a final thought. Earlier, in quoting James Madison,
I spoke of the Framers' firm belief in the "common good" and the
sense of duty, called "virtue," to pursue the common good. The
theme, long dominant in American public life, runs back through
the Framers to John Locke, St. Thomas Aquinas, the Stoic and
Hellenic philosophers, and perhaps beyond. You will recall Plato's
poignant description of the final hours of Socrates. His friends had
urged him to escape; his jailor had deliberately left the door open
so that he could escape. But Socrates stayed to drink the hemlock
cup. "The Athenians have thought fit to condemn me," he explained
to his friends, "and I have thought it better and more right to remain
here and undergo my sentence," even though "these muscles and
bones of mine would have gone off long ago ... if they had been
moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not
chosen ... the better and nobler part." The civilized man put first
his obligations to his community even above his own life. The civ-
ilized man would not cheat the law, even a law he knew to be wrong,
because he also knew that, if Athens were to be governed and Ath-
enians were to be free, the government must be by citizens whose
better natures prevailed and who therefore put society's need above
their own advantage. (It was the latter principle, which we lack time
to discuss tonight, that was at stake in Watergate.)
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The belief in the civilized man's duty to subdue the will of "these
bones and muscles" in favor of the nobler part and to subordinate
self-advantage to the common good gradually found more detailed
expression in the ethical standards of the professions, the rules gov-
erning fiduciaries, and the obligations of individuals in public life.
The ethical standards shaped their conduct by defining their ex-
pectations of themselves and also the general public's expectations
of them. We need those professional codes, statutes, and executive
orders, both to express our moral sense and to sharpen awareness
of its applications.
But we cannot establish high ethical standards by legislation alone.
The personal code by which each Senator, Representative, and other
public official judges himself or herself - the code by which we
individually judge ourselves - will do more to govern individual
performance than all the statutes and executive orders on the books.
And while our political history tells of frequent corruption, there
were always enough prominent public figures who lived by the code
and with the courage to speak when strong voices were needed to
keep the ideal a reality, setting examples for their own and future
generations.
Earlier I spoke of the "decline" or "fading" of this philosophy.
Standing alone, the words are wrong. "Temporary" shall be added.
For I am confident that the sense of common purpose and of ded-
ication to the common good will again grow strong. Those who
study the past can see that man moves ahead neither swiftly nor
directly, but blundering along as in a swamp in the dark, two steps
forward, then one and even two steps back before another step
ahead. But the dark always lightens. Not full light of day - perhaps
not ever. But we learn to walk straighter. It is always dawn.
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